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Agricultural Economics Research
David L. Debertin, E. Jane Luzar, and Orlando D. Chambers
This article examines some difficult decisions that agricultural economists must confront in
doing  research.  Over  many  years,  rules  and  standards  have  developed  in  agricultural
economics that guide researchers, providing an underlying framework for research methods.
This article  deals  with  applying  these  seldom  discussed  guidelines  to  specific  research
situations  confronted  by agricultural  economists.  With this article,  we hope to stimulate a
dialogue among agricultural economists about the need for additional,  appropriate methodo-
logical guidelines  in agricultural economics research.
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Introduction
It would  be  absurd to claim  that  this institutionalized  mechanism  [of scientific  protocol]  for sifting
warranted beliefs has operated or is likely to operate in social inquiry as effectively as it has in the natural
sciences.  But  it  would  be  no  less  absurd  to  conclude  that  reliable  knowledge  of human  affairs  is
unattainable.
(Ernest Nagel, The Structure of Science, p. 490)
Just and Rausser depict agricultural economics as a "club" that must examine rules guiding
the behavior  of its members  and  adapt  or become  extinct  (p.  1177).  The  acceptance  of
common values and  beliefs defines  a subculture or "club"  and facilitates  communication
among its members (Boulding). To be ethical, members of  a club must adhere to certain rules
or standards that govern their conduct in accordance with the principles of the club. In this
respect, agricultural economists are no different from members of any other club. However,
agricultural  economists vary  in academic  backgrounds,  skills,  and interests.  Furthermore,
not all agricultural  economics researchers  agree on a common protocol to guide research.
Other disciplines,  including  some in the social  sciences,  have developed explicit rules to
guide research and  the behavior of researchers.  For example, the American  Sociological
Association  has  a  lengthy  code  of ethics  that  provides  specific  rules and  standards  for
conducting  research,  and  also  includes  items  related  to  teaching  and  the  treatment  of
employees.
The objective of this study is to examine  some of the difficult decisions that individuals
face  while  doing agricultural  economics  research  and  to suggest  needed  changes  in our
research protocol.  Agricultural  economics organizations  have never attempted to develop
a code of ethics to guide research behavior to the same degree that the American Sociological
David L. Debertin is a professor of agricultural economics at the University of Kentucky;  E. Jane Luzar is an associate professor
of agricultural  economics  at Louisiana  State  University;  and  Orlando D.  Chambers is  a  graduate research  assistant  at the
University of Kentucky. The views in this article are those of the authors.
The authors express  appreciation  to Alan J. Randall,  Eldon D. Smith,  and a number of anonymous  reviewers  who have
provided helpful  comments on various  drafts of this paper.Needfor Protocol in Research  83
Association has, and they may not wish to now. However, we believe that it is important to
engage in a profession-wide discussion of the rules and standards that guide the conduct of
agricultural  economics  research.  We  hope  to  stimulate thinking  about current  rules  and
standards, and we shall suggest some practical changes in the way agricultural economists
perform and report research.
We believe that in any discipline, including agricultural  economics, established  guide-
lines, rules, or standards facilitate communication among researchers and provide  a funda-
mental  foundation for the procedures employed in conducting research. These rules play a
role  in the  decisions  made by agricultural  economists while  conducting  research  and  in
reporting  research results. Since  these rules are  not part of an explicit code of ethics for
agricultural  economics,  many  agricultural  economists  may  not be  fully  aware  of their
function  and  importance.  These  rules provide  the  foundation  upon  which  much  of the
behavior  of individual  researchers  ultimately  is  based.  The  credibility  of an  individual
researcher  is  based upon  the  adherence  to  guidelines  and  procedures  for  obtaining  and
assessing evidence accepted and used by the discipline2 as a whole.
The issues we discuss here are not new and have been addressed in some manner by other
authors  (Castle  1972;  Randall  1974;  Barry;  Breimyer;  Tomek).  But these  issues  need
additional  consideration  and  discussion  among  agricultural  economists.  The  following
statements outline our basic thesis.
1. Although agricultural economists may not be able to agree upon as comprehensive
and detailed a code of ethics as that of the American Sociological Association, we
believe that  a written  statement  should be developed  outlining the generally ac-
cepted guidelines  and research  standards under which  all agricultural  economics
researchers should operate.
2.  There  is  a  need  for  an additional journal  or  section  of a journal  in  agricultural
economics that focuses on research which seeks to confirm the results obtained from
previous empirical research. Too often, empirical studies in agricultural economics
attempting to confirm the work of  previous authors are rejected simply because they
offer nothing "new."  However,  Tomek (p. 6) notes that "attempts  to confirm prior
work provides a depth of understanding that is otherwise unattainable."
3.  New computer technologies, including the ability to rapidly transfer large programs
and data sets from one institution to another, provide  important new opportunities
for accessing data and programs used by other researchers. This will make it possible
for  researchers  interested  in  what  Tomek  calls  confirmation-based  research  to
proceed  with  greater  ease.  While  some  associations  and journals,  including  the
Western Agricultural  Economics Association,  have in the past made it possible for
researchers to obtain the data used to conduct research, it should now also be possible
to provide other researchers with the author's computer programs,  such as simula-
tion models.
IThe dictionary  (Webster, definition 4) defines protocol as "the plan for scientific experiment or treatment."  As used in this
paper, research  protocol  is a set of rules that guide how the specific research  technique  is applied or how particular research
results are interpreted and evaluated,  not the choice of the particular quantitative technique  or empirical method to be used.
2Many  would  not consider  agricultural  economics to be a single discipline  but rather a combination of many disciplines.
Certainly there are differences in  the criteria, peers, procedures, and kind of knowledge generated  between multidisciplinary
and  disciplinary  work.  Under  definitions  such  as  those  provided  by  Johnson,  most of the  research  done  on  agricultural
economics  would not be termed disciplinary.  However,  the term  discipline  is still used here to describe  research done within
agricultural  economics.
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The Code of Ethics of the American Sociological Association is a lengthy document that
includes material not strongly linked to research methodology,  such as dealing with other
professionals  and  with  students,  confidentiality  of survey  data,  the treatment  of human
subjects  in research,  obligations of journal editors, and even employment practices.  How-
ever, some of the items in this document are concerned with issues in research methodology
and might be adapted to agricultural economics with only slight modification. Examples we
might use with  slight modification as taken  directly from the document (p.  2)  include the
following:
1.  In  presenting  their  work,  sociologists  are  obligated  to  report  their  findings  fully  and  should  not
misrepresent the findings of their research. When  work is presented,  they are obligated to report their
findings fully and without omission of significant data.  To the best of their ability,  sociologists  should
also disclose details of their theories, methods, and research designs that might bear upon interpretations
of research  findings.
2.  Consistent with the spirit of  full disclosure of  method and analysis, sociologists, after they have completed
their own  analyses,  should cooperate  in  efforts  to make raw data and other  pertinent documentation
collected and prepared at public expense available to other social scientists, at reasonable costs ....
3.  Sociologists  must not accept grants,  contracts  or research  assignments  that  appear  likely  to require
violation of the principles enunciated in this Code ....
4.  Sociologists  should  take  particular  care  to  state  all  significant  qualifications  on  the  findings  and
interpretation  of their research.
We  believe  that  agricultural  economists  should make  an  effort  to  develop  a  written
document that outlines  widely  accepted rules.  However,  because agricultural  economists
have widely varying backgrounds and interests,  and as a result, their research goals are also
diverse,  reaching a consensus  on a written statement  following a format such as this could
prove difficult.
Research Protocol and Institutions
Consider two agricultural economists. The first works as a policy analyst and seeks to shape
local, state, or federal public policy toward agriculture and rural America.  The second is an
academic  researcher  who  seeks  to  develop  and  advance  economic  theory  applicable  to
agriculture.  These two agricultural economists may have very different goals and interests,
but the  same  written statement  would need  to  apply to  both individuals  as they  seek to
conduct and use research.
Faculty in the so-called "wet-lab" sciences,  including the biological scientists, who are
the majority of faculty  in most colleges of agriculture,  may have it somewhat  easier than
agricultural  economists  do. Unlike  the social sciences,  the biological sciences place great
emphasis  on reproducing  exactly the  work  of other  scientists in  an effort to  confirm  or
disconfirm past research results. This search for "truth" about reality-the essence of most
biological and physical sciences-provides the foundation for research conduct.
In the non-social sciences,  such research usually involves setting up a laboratory or field
experiment in an effort to make another attempt to collect similar data. In the social sciences,
however,  comparatively  few studies involve the collection of primary data sets,  and most
rely  on  secondary  data  series  not collected  by the  researchers  themselves.  Ideally, two
agricultural  economics researchers that employ the same data set and the same quantitative
technique  should be able to obtain exactly the same results.  In reality, this may not always
be the case.
Differences in results obtained by two different agricultural economics researchers who
are attempting to apply the same model and quantitative technique to the same data set could
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include  (a) unintended errors made by one or both of the researchers  in implementing the
quantitative  technique  (Dewald,  Thursby,  and Anderson, p.  587);  (b)  data entry or other
errors in the data files themselves; (c) differences in secondary data sets as a result of updates
and revisions by the collecting agency; and (d) differences in how calculations are performed
within different  statistical packages  implementing the same  quantitative technique.  In the
University of Kentucky agricultural economics department, instances have already occurred
in which the widely publicized  floating point error in the Pentium® chip led to noticeably
different results  in a spreadsheet program when results were  compared with calculations
done on a computer without that particular chip error. These kinds of  problems are analogous
to the errors and contamination  problems that frequently  occur in laboratory  experiments.
Without attempts by other researchers to exactly replicate a study, these kinds of errors may
frequently go undetected.
Controversy still exists when scientists argue in favor of a particular explanation for an
observed  phenomenon,  but through  efforts  conducted  by  other  scientists,  advocates  of
explanations  inconsistent  with  the  "truth"  are  eventually  discovered  and  are  ultimately
discarded.  Testing  hypotheses  in  the  physical  and  biological  sciences  usually  requires
laboratory experiments conducted  such that another researcher  doing the same test should
be able  to obtain  similar results.  If the goal  of science is explanation,  then  such research
authenticates the analysis and confirms its validity. The controversy surrounding the inability
to confirm results from the Utah "cold fusion" research provides insight into how the process
normally works in the physical sciences. If a laboratory experiment cannot confirm a result,
then the original research  is appropriately questioned.
Some biological research  is not easily replicated.  Instances  where biological  scientists
have deliberately falsified results of laboratory experiments have made newspaper headlines,
but only after other scientists  made confirmation  attempts.  Unlike our "wet-lab"  counter-
parts, social scientists seldom, if ever, discard a theory, no matter how many times it fails in
an empirical setting. Indeed, it is often argued that theories  in economics are never tested in
an empirical setting: it is merely the applicability  of a particular theory to a specific empirical
problem that is being tested.
Most  social  science  data  are  very  different  from  that  collected  through  controlled
experiments.  While the biological  and physical sciences  frequently  conduct laboratory or
field  experiments  to  obtain  data,  agricultural  economists  (and  other  social  scientists)
frequently  use  data  they  did  not  collect  and  make  simplifying  assumptions  that  allow
complex problems to be analyzed.  Seldom is the social  scientist explicitly concerned with
the  issue  of whether or not  the  exact  same  results can be  obtained  by other researchers
employing the same data set and technique.
Popper's basic approach  of scientific  inquiry based upon  falsification  through  critical
processes is  thought by many agricultural  economists  to be the basis for research within
agricultural  economics.  Popper's  approach  applies  fairly  well  to most biological science
research  conducted  within  agricultural  experiment  stations.  The  difficulty  in  applying
Popper's  views  to  agricultural  economics  is  that  he  dismisses  many  of the  problems
encountered  by agricultural  economists  and other social  scientists  as not science,  that  is,
inappropriate for scientific inquiry (p.  158). Popper likes hypothesis testing under laboratory
conditions where the collection of the data is controlled by the researcher, not hypothesis
testing employing secondary data outside of the researcher's control.
The  misapplication  and  inadequacy  of the  positivism  advocated  by Popper  in  social
science research have increased  the appeal of"alternatives to Popper" in the philosophy of
science  and methodology of economics, leading to books on methodology for economists
such  as those by Blaug,  Caldwell,  and Johnson.  Also,  a  new book by Gebremedhin  and
Debertin, Luzar, and ChambersJournal  ofAgricultural and Resource Economics
Tweeten  focuses on research method issues  in the social  sciences.  There  is no consensus
among  these  writers  on  the  "right"  method  for  approaching  economic  research.  Many
methodology  writers  now  advocate  an  eclectic  approach  toward  research  in  the  social
sciences  embodying  various  styles  and  approaches  along with a less rigid  adherence  to
falsification principles  advocated by Popper (McCloskey; Caldwell; Hausman).
The eclectic approach to research methodology as advocated by these recent authors calls
for an assessment of conduct and reporting within  agricultural economics  research.  Does
the eclectic approach suggest that there are no longer any specific rules to be followed, and
that any methodological  approach for social  science research  is warranted? This would be
a form of methodological  anarchy as advocated  by Feyerabend.  Most agricultural econo-
mists would probably  not yet subscribe  to this view,  nor perhaps  should they!  Empirical
analyses that use sophisticated leading-edge  quantitative techniques  are becoming increas-
ingly prevalent  in agricultural  economics  research,  to the exclusion  of other approaches
(Debertin and Pagoulatos). The application of these sophisticated tools may make it appear,
at least to a non-economist,  that somehow  agricultural economics research is being trans-
formed  into  something  more  like  a  laboratory  science  with  ever  greater  emphasis  on
numerical findings. Agricultural  economists know better than that. No matter the sophisti-
cation of the quantitative method, a social science cannot be transformed into a hard science.
Of course, some researchers  might argue that application of these increasingly sophisti-
cated techniques may ultimately make economic research more testable and therefore more
applicable to Popperian  falsification.  The intent may be to prove a hypothesis through an
empirical  test,  but much of the empirical  analysis  in agricultural  economics  is actually a
demonstration that the novel quantitative technique works with a real data set rather than a
serious attempt to falsify testable predictions.  Blaug argues that much empirical  economic
research "is like playing tennis with the net down: instead of attempting to refute testable
predictions, modem economists all too  frequently are satisfied to demonstrate that the real
world conforms  to  their predictions,  thus replacing  falsification,  which  is  difficult, with
verification, which is easy" (p. 256).
Research using mathematical  programming and computer simulation models that do not
involve formal hypothesis testing (as econometric research does) raises additional difficult
questions  regarding  the  appropriateness  of applying  Popper's  falsification  principles.
Johnson  and  Rausser  note that  the common  use of paradigms  as maintained  hypotheses
orients research towards propositions which may not, in the Popperian sense, be testable (p.
169).  Many social  scientists deny that testing a research model which requires the manipu-
lation of quantitative  data is even possible and  argue that economists  should not confine
themselves to such an approach.  Others believe this approach has limited creativity and has
led to mathematical  tinkering  rather than addressing  new problems (Just and Rausser,  p.
1179; Barry, p. 2).
Standards for Behavior
Although a few agricultural  economists  have called  for less dominance  of mathematical
techniques  in agricultural  economics  research,  the incentive  for publishing  research with
novel quantitative  techniques  is high.  In  1990,  over 92%  of the articles published  in our
American Journal of Agricultural Economics used  some  type  of quantitative  method
compared  to just  52%  in  1965  (Debertin  and Pagoulatos,  p.  4).  Are the methodological
foundations of these empirical articles based on Popperian falsification, or is any thought at
all given to the methodological foundations of  applied agricultural economics research? This
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question may be especially relevant for graduate students and other agricultural economists
whose methodological approach to research is in its formative stage.
Castle (1989)  points out that the limited time  in a graduate program  may prohibit the
learning  of alternative  theories,  lead to  repetitive use  of the  same theory, and result  in a
narrow-minded  view  of research  methodology  (p.  5). A research  environment  in  which
increasingly  sophisticated mathematical  techniques and applications are employed, meth-
odological  conditions are  chranging  rapidly, and journal editors and reviewers increasingly
desire articles that employ new approaches  and data, supports  the need for a set of agreed
upon guidelines to direct and enhance the credibility of agricultural economics research. As
Hausman suggests, "the normative role of methodology is unavoidable; whether methodo-
logical rules are garnered from imitation, methodological  asides, or systematic  methodo-
logical treatises, there is no doing economics without some standards or norms. Furthermore,
if economics  is to make any rational claim to guide policy, these standards or norms cannot
be arbitrary" (p.  123). There must be limits to the laissez-faire  approach to research.
Suppose,  for example, that  an agricultural  economist developed  a new and promising
theoretical  model  representing  economic  phenomena  of interest,  but  needed  empirical
evidence to  support the formulation.  The  data  set needed to do this may exist. However,
upon initial estimation of model parameters, the researcher discovers that the data do not
provide parameter  estimates  consistent with a thorough and rigorously developed  model
specification. Further analysis traces the problem to one or two outliers in the  t  outliedata  set, and
removal of these outliers provides parameter estimates that, while perhaps not perfect, are
largely consistent with the theoretical arguments.
Each  alternative  approach  for  dealing  with  this  problem  involves  decisions  by  the
individual researcher, but each alternative also has implications for the system that guides
research.  For example, an attempt might be made to publish the theoretical model without
the  empirical  evidence,  particularly  if the  research  is  very  well  done.  But without  the
empirical  evidence, the  probability of acceptance  by a journal  is reduced.  The empirical
results could be presented without alteration of the original data set, and the researcher could
show that the empirical results are inconsistent with the theoretical development. Again, the
probability of acceptance may be reduced, given the incompatibility between the  noatilitheoretical
development  and  the  empirical  results.  Alternatively,  the  agricultural  economist  might
simply discard the outliers and publish only the results from a truncated data set, without
discussing  the  research  procedure  used.  Or the  researcher  might  indicate  the  research
procedure used, but attempt to publish only the results from the truncated data set. Another
possibility is to show two sets of equations, explaining fully the impact of the outliers on
the parameter estimates.
This illustration is used not because there is a single correct alternative that is "proper"
scientific behavior by the individual. Rather, the case illustrates that it is sometimes difficult
for  the  researcher  to  make  the  right  decision  even  when  confronting  ordinary  research
problems.  Furthermore,  the "proper" decision by the researcher in borderline cases can be
even more difficult  to identify.  The dividing line between acceptable versus unacceptable
research practices is not always  clear.  For many  agricultural economists,  an adherence to
scientific method might continue even when at variance with professional self-interest-that
is, getting the journal article published.
Most agricultural  economists attempt to accurately report the findings of their research
because  they  believe  that  accurate  reporting  is  proper.  Further,  if the  researcher  were
dishonest  and  reported  results  that  are  improved by  changing  signs  on  coefficients  or
increasing a t-ratio, there  is always the (admittedly small)  danger that the changes will be
discovered either within the review process or after publication. Most important, however,
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is that the confidence of the researcher in the research findings is rooted in a belief that the
findings could be reproduced by other researchers  in the discipline, even though it is unlikely
that another researcher will ever attempt to do so.
Several  examples  further  illustrate  situations  in which  such  guidelines  should  play  a
critical role  in guiding applied research  in the social sciences.  First, social scientists often
report  only  the  best  empirical  results.  This  applies  not  only  to  agricultural  economics
analyses using statistics, but also to studies which make use of mathematical programming,
simulation, or other quantitative techniques.
Social  scientists,  including  agricultural  economists,  often  rework  theoretical  models
based  on  initial  empirical  results  to  ensure  that  theoretical  and  empirical  models  are
consistent.  Specifications of equations may be adjusted based on initial empirical evidence,
and nonsignificant variables  may be eliminated from initial model  specifications.  Missing
values  may be  inserted  into  a  data  series by  interpolating  between known  values  or by
inserting the means of the other observations already in the data set.
Some of these examples may appear simply to be normal research procedure within many
social  sciences.  For example,  choosing  the  best of the  available  research  evidence  for
reporting in a journal article is normal behavior for researchers both in and out of the social
sciences. The burden of providing disconfirming evidence is placed on peers. Few applied
researchers  have not  made at least small changes  in model  specifications  based on initial
empirical evidence contained in the data. Certainly the data provide a basis for changing the
hypothesis,  but theoretical  arguments are sometimes  formalized after initial relationships
have  been  identified  within  the  data,  thus  ensuring  that  the empirical  evidence  will  not
conflict with the theoretical arguments.
Some of the common decisions  a researcher makes may deviate from standard research
rules depending on the specifics of the case involved. For example, removal of outliers from
data  sets  might  be  supportable  if the  researcher  substantiates  that  the  data  for  these
observations  are  inaccurate,  but  offending  data  and  a  rationale  for  rejection  could  be
presented. When this strategy is used as a means of coloring or modifying the results, there
is concern.  A social  scientist may  have little  choice but to fill  in missing  observations  if
research is to proceed. However, failure to report that the procedure was used and its possible
implications on the outcome is a serious issue.
The problem of specification  bias resulting  from the use of stepwise regression models
has  been documented  elsewhere  (Freund  and Debertin).  Excluding  variables that do  not
behave as anticipated can lead to serious specification-error problems. Research articles in
which such techniques are used to develop  initial model  specifications may sometimes  be
identifiable,  for they may lack a rigorous derivation of the theoretical model that forms the
basis for the specification.  However, researchers are becoming much more adept at disguis-
ing that a conceptual section was written last. In addition, encouragement  by both reviewers
and editors to present equations with significant t-ratios can lead a researcher to use such
approaches even when they conflict with best judgment.
Furthermore, if a researcher were dishonest, a coefficient with a different sign or a smaller
standard error than was estimated could usually be reported with little chance of it ever being
found.  Deliberate dishonesty  is somewhat  different  from the other cases  and represents  a
violation of personal ethics and scientific research ethics. While  it is difficult to determine
the frequency of such abuses, behavior similar to this by agricultural economics researchers
is probably not widespread.
Tangney has done  research  on this  issue. Although  her study involved behavioral  and
social  scientists, respondents did not include agricultural economists. Tangney (1987a, b, c)
conducted a survey designed to assess scientists' attitudes toward and perception of scientific
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fraud. The survey was sent to  1,100 scientists at a major university. Of the 245 respondents,
41%  were behavioral  and  social  scientists,  40%  biological  scientists,  and  19%  physical
scientists. The survey response indicated that 32% of the respondents suspected a colleague
in their field of some form of scientific fraud, but most took no action against the suspected
colleague.  Tangney is quick to point out that measuring the perception of scientific fraud is
not the same thing as measuring the actual prevalence of scientific fraud.
The results  of Tangney's  survey  suggest,  however,  that  scientific  fraud  is a  problem
worthy of  concern and attention among scientists both in and out of the social sciences. Other
than replication  by another researcher,  there is little to prevent deliberate dishonesty from
occurring.  In this instance, the governing regulations of the university are the protocol, and
proof of deliberate dishonesty is grounds for dismissal at many universities.
Quality Control through Confirmation
In  agricultural  economics,  particular  emphasis  needs  to  be  placed  on  maintaining  and
upgrading  the quality-control  system that  is  supposed  to discourage  scientific  fraud.  For
example,  within agricultural economics  there has usually been only a limited emphasis on
confirmation  as  a  path  to  publication,  in  comparison  with  the  emphasis  placed  on the
publishing of studies that confirm earlier results within the biological and physical sciences
and even within some of the other social sciences. Tomek makes an excellent case in support
of the need  for  agricultural  economists  to devote  additional  effort toward publication of
confirmation research. The problem is that much economic research is heavily geared toward
the publication of new  findings.  The economist must show that the research is innovative,
for creativity is one mark of a scholar. If the research is a new and more promising approach
to a problem, it will not use the same data or quantitative technique. If the same quantitative
technique  and a similar data set are used, this may be interpreted as a lack of trust between
researchers.  Although creativity carries risk,  agricultural economics research which repre-
sents  a new  and  innovative  approach  to  a  problem,  particularly  an  approach that  takes
advantage of a quantitative  technique  that has not previously been used, is generally  well
received and is sometimes published even with substantive technical flaws in the empirical
component.
When an agricultural economist has a serious disagreement with the findings of an earlier
study, an attempt might be made to reproduce earlier results-but such papers generally are
not publishable if they simply repeat the work of peers and reach similar conclusions, even
if the data set has been revised  or contains additional  observations.  In the biological and
physical sciences,  the ability to reproduce  findings provides  additional  evidence and will
generally warrant publication. Thus, the burden of proof in these sciences is on the journal
editors and peer reviewers to find sufficient flaws in a study to warrant a negative publication
decision. A colleague in the biological sciences argues that failure to publish an article within
the biological  sciences that meets minimum technical  standards with regard to the conduct
of the research constitutes a withholding of information, and most journal editors within the
biological  sciences would not want to do this.
Within  agricultural  economics, the publication decision by editors often rests heavily
on whether or not the technique  is novel. Within the social sciences, the burden is therefore
on the author to prove that the research makes a significant contribution to the progress  of
the discipline.  Social science journal editors and reviewers need to agree that findings  are
new enough and important enough to warrant a positive publication decision.
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As a consequence,  acceptance  rates for journals  in agricultural  disciplines outside the
social sciences are often much higher than within the social sciences (Lacy and Busch). The
likely primary reason  editors reject articles  in the social  sciences  is that the technique  or
results are deemed insufficiently new or novel, not because of a basic flaw in the procedures
or data used in conducting  the research.  In the biological  and physical  sciences,  rejected
articles  likely  consist  primarily  of those  in which  some  basic flaw  in  the  experimental
procedure was discovered, not because the problem being studied had been studied by other
researchers,  or  because  the  experimental  procedure  was  similar  to  that  used  by  other
researchers.
In a brief symposium paper in 1955, Elmer Working, a pioneer in demand analysis, stated
that "statistical studies of demand increased apace [prior to World War II] but relatively few
were  published"  (p.  970).  This  limited publication  was  (in part)  "because  of unresolved
doubts on the meaning  and reliability of the results.  The  studies  were  never considered
finished or suitable for publication by those who conducted them." Scientific perfectionism
as described  by Working  can be incompatible with the six-year promotion rule present  at
many universities. The social sciences may now require more tangible evidence of scholarly
progress than before. Because of this, the performance of the quality-control institutions that
police the various  social science disciplines  is likely to be more severely tested.
Impartiality, the Protocol, and Favorable Research Results
One controversial  view,  currently particularly fashionable  among some researchers in the
biological and physical sciences, is that objectivity or research impartiality by a researcher
is neither necessary nor sufficient for good research. This view maintains that science is not
science only because researchers  are objective individuals.  Many excellent  scientists have
strong expectations  regarding relationships.  Further, the driving force behind experiments,
both in and out of the social sciences, is a hunch or even stronger conviction by the researcher
that certain relationships must hold.
This view also holds that  scientists generally do not devise experiments in an effort to
show that the null hypothesis is accepted. Rather, virtually all scientists (including biological,
physical, and social scientists) select from their findings the best results for publication, and
in so doing, expose only the best results to other scientists. This is the practice of agricultural
economists,  when  the  regression  equation  with  the  correct  signs  on  all  the  parameter
estimates,  significant  t-ratios,  and  a  high coefficient  of determination  is the  one  finally
chosen for inclusion in a journal article.
Robert Millikan, a noted physicist, often selected only the best results for publication. In
the margins of  his laboratory notebook, intended for the eyes of  no one else, were comments.
These margin notes included statements such as "this is a very good result, publish it," or in
other  instances,  "this result is inconsistent with what should have happened.  Examine the
equipment  and procedure that was used to obtain this result more carefully.  Don't publish."
(Goodstein).
Reexamination  of Gregor  Mendel's  original  genetic  experiments  by  R.A.  Fisher,  a
statistician,  and  Sewall  Wright,  a geneticist,  using  a chi-squared  analysis,  revealed  that
Mendel's  results  were  in  fact "too  good  to be  true."  Tempering  charges  that  deliberate
falsification had occurred  at the monastery,  Wright instead explained,  "I am afraid that it
must be concluded that Mendel made occasional  subconscious errors in favor of expecta-
tions" (Hodges, Krech, and Crutchfield).3 Mendel's "laws" (probabilities of inheritance of
dominant and recessive traits) have guided genetic research for many years, and only recently
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molecular biologists have learned that the rules governing the inheritance of many genetic
traits are far more subtle and complicated than Mendel believed. One might question whether
research progress in the biological sciences would have proceeded at a faster pace if Mendel
had completely disclosed his findings, including the occasional inconsistent and disconfirm-
ing results, rather than reporting only those results that tended to entirely support his expected
probabilities.
Most scientists are not unlike Mendel in their passion for their own theories. In much of
science,  it is the researcher's passion and persuasion, not objectivity, that is the real force
pushing scientific  research  forward  both  in and  out of the  social  sciences.  Furthermore,
experimental  procedures  are  always  more  carefully  examined  in  instances  where  the
outcome is inconsistent with the researcher's expectations. Moreover, this lack of objectivity
by the researcher,  or for that matter, the more careful  scrutiny of the experimental design
and procedures  (for agricultural  economists,  mathematical  programming,  simulation  and
econometric  models, coefficients and data) when the results are inconsistent with expecta-
tions  does  not  necessarily  result  in  "bad"  research.  Social  scientists  are  not  the  only
researchers  who  are  neither  impartial  nor  objective.  No good  researcher  is  completely
impartial and objective. It is this lack of impartiality and strong belief in one's own theories
that drives researchers to solve problems.
According  to those who advocate  this position,  what makes  for good  research  is the
researcher's fundamental belief that the results obtained can and will be substantiated by the
work of other researchers.  They  argue that many excellent  researchers  publish only their
best results,  and  in so  doing,  the researcher  is not inherently  involved  in a violation  of
scientific  rules and sandards. Furthermore,  they suggest that a researcher who  publishes
only the best results is not cheating, or acting at variance with accepted scientific procedures,
if the researcher truly  elieves that these best results  can be substantiated through careful
effort by other  researchers  within the discipline.  Among  other researchers  may be those
whose values and, hence, expectations strongly differ. In other words, what separates a good
researcher  from one  who  is attempting  to cheat  is that  the good  researcher believes  the
findings can be confirmed,  even by researchers who disagree with the results.
The ability to confirm results obtained by other scientists and the willingness by other
scientists to do this are key elements  for scientific progress within a discipline. If we were
to apply this view to researchers in agricultural economics, we would conclude that having
many agricultural economists who have strong values and lack objectivity is not what leads
to "bad" research.  What leads to bad research  is a failure to recognize the contribution to
scientific progress made by a researcher within agricultural economics who is able to confirm
the results of a previous study.
Tangney's  survey results would not be so disturbing if we knew that other researchers'
evidence  would  eventually  "weed  out"  studies  (and  eventually  destroy  reputations  of
researchers) with misreported findings either by mistake or fraud. If such a view were widely
adopted by agricultural economists, research would be restructured such that far more effort
would be devoted to attempts at confirming (or disconfirming) the work of our peers, along
the lines that Tomek suggests.
3These comments regarding  Mendel's  reporting of research  results  are particularly  illuminating  in that the rules developed
by Mendel that explain inheritance of traits are undergoing increasing scrutiny. Since the rigid rules governing inheritance from
dominant  and  recessive  genes  are  no  longer thought  to apply  in  all  instances  (Begley,  pp.  77-78),  perhaps  some of the
inconsistencies between  anticipated and actual  results that Gregor Mendel  had observed and not reported because  they "must
have been due to laboratory error" were instances in which genetics was not entirely behaving according to the rules that Mendel
developed and strongly believed.
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The potential for abuse of scientific credibility exists when sponsoring research institu-
tions maintain a set of values which, in part, ensures the ongoing existence of the institution
itself.  Public  and  professional  perception  of the  dilemma  resulting  from the  potentially
compromising linkage between funding sources and research impartiality has created what
Castle (1980)  calls a great need for universities to enhance their credibility. Nonimpartiality
in the hypothesis-testing process, undampened by a guiding set of institutionalized rules and
standards,  can  create  an  atmosphere  conducive  to  the  manipulation  and publication  of
self-serving  research  results.  For  example,  if the  applied  social  sciences  have  become
enamored  with the need  for  favorable  research  findings (evidence  for the existence  of a
relationship),  the normal review process will be biased in that direction.
Blaug argues that "all scientific hypotheses have philosophical, social, and even political
undertones,  which  may prejudice  scientists  in  evaluating  the evidence  for and  against  a
particular hypothesis.  Ideological biases  and special pleading  of all kinds  are a universal
feature of scientific work for which the only remedy is the public criticism of other scientists
relying on the  shared professional  standards of the subject"  (p.  153).  Problems  arise if a
researcher must improve the results of a study to make it publishable, and in doing so, the
researcher must violate the rules of scientific method.
A Call for Action
Agricultural economists need to discuss the issues in this paper.  In the past, many of these
issues have been treated as if they were  topics that should not properly be raised in polite
circles of social scientists. It is time to evaluate the research standards that guide agricultural
economists  and  assess  the  effectiveness  of our  quality-control  institutions,  such  as the
refereeing  process.  For example,  should  we  continue  to  place  such  heavy  emphasis  on
innovation as the path to publication rather than research that seeks to confirm or refute past
studies? If such research is to be valued (published), both researchers and referees will need
to rethink their positions on what constitutes research progress in agricultural economics.
This suggests the need to develop additional externally  sanctioned guidelines  for research
specifically aimed at confirming or refuting previous research.
While  many unstated  but generally understood  guidelines  are  commonly followed  in
agricultural  economics,  there  are  no  specific  standards  for  ethical  research behavior  by
agricultural  economists.  The  Code  of Ethics  of the  American  Sociological  Association
establishes  some  practical  requirements  for the  ethical  behavior of social  scientists  and
provides a methodological foundation for doing social  science research.  We are fascinated
that an entire discipline agreed to comply with a specific set of guidelines. Could agricultural
economists  ever agree  upon the content of a written code that deals with issues in research
methodology?  A comparatively  simple statement that focuses on a few important methodo-
logical  issues  that  are  frequently  encountered  in  agricultural  economics  research  might
adequately serve our needs.  Discussions among agricultural economists about the specific
items to be included in such a statement may prove fruitful in highlighting important issues.
Such discussions could create  a new awareness of many of the issues raised in this article
and stimulate thinking  about the importance of research methodology  in conducting agri-
cultural economics research.
A few journals that publish research in economics have made an effort to confront some
of the issues raised in this paper. For example,  a special arrangement was instituted by the
Journal of Econometrics and  the  Review  of Public Data Use.  These  journals  jointly
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established  a publication program that gives authors  a preferential opportunity to publish
complementary  articles  in the Review relating  data used  in  applied journal  articles.  One
purpose of this arrangement  is to encourage a uniformly high quality of research methodol-
ogy  (Renfro). An  approach  such as  this could  be effectively used in other social  science
disciplines  as well.
A complementary  action in the applied areas  involves the creation of a discipline-wide
computerized  information  system  through  Internet  with  data  and  programs  supporting
research published in the major professional journals, and involving efforts of the editors of
all the agricultural economics journals that publish applied research employing quantitative
methods.  The Journal of Business and Economic Statistics and  the Journal of Applied
Econometrics now  place  data  on  the  Internet.  Search  algorithms  such  as  Gopher  and
simplified procedures  for transfer  of data from  host computers to the researcher  via File
Transfer  Protocol  (FTP)  make  it technologically  feasible  for researchers  to quickly  gain
access to virtually any public-domain  computer program or data set.
Thus,  the  Internet  might provide  ready  access  not  only  to  data used in  econometric
investigations,  but also to the software constructed by other researchers  that was used for
estimating model  parameters,  as well  as copies  of researcher-constructed  simulation  and
mathematical  programming models.  Ready availability  of the data and programs through
this computerized  information  network could  form the foundation for a system  of checks
and balances  now lacking  in agricultural  economics.  The  additional  cost of creating  and
maintaining such a database  would, of course, be a concern.
It is our belief that the difficulty in simply transferring computer programs and data from
one  institution to  another has  discouraged  much of the research  called for in this study.
Furthermore,  lack of ready  access  to  the models used by  other researchers  has  made  it
difficult for agricultural economics  scientists to build and improve upon the published work
of other scientists to the extent that this occurs in many other disciplines. What a computer-
ized information network such as this would permit is easy access to any of the quantitative
models and data published in an agricultural economics journal.  Benefits to the profession
in terms of increased  scientific  credibility could  be great.  The fact  that other researchers
have access to a model means that they might attempt to experiment with it, further improve
its specification,  or correct other "obvious" flaws. If serious errors inadvertently occurred,
these might  eventually  be uncovered  as researchers  attempt to reestimate  the model  and
improve upon it. Furthermore, knowing that others in the profession would have ready access
to data and programs should further deter researchers from fabricating or doctoring results.
Besides  the need for accessing  data and programs, King  has suggested that the actual
documentation of the data in the reporting system is incomplete and often of  an inappropriate
form. A profession-wide  effort within  agricultural  economics to standardize  proper docu-
mentation  besides  making  data  and programs  readily available  through  a  computerized
information network would  lead to wider acceptance  of results and greater credibility  (p.
846).
The inclusion of data sets  has long been essential  in economic research.  Frisch,  in the
first issue of Econometrica, indicated that "in statistical and other numerical work presented
in Econometrica  the original raw data will, as a rule, be published, unless their volume  is
excessive. This is important in order to stimulate criticism, control, and further studies" (p.
3). Dewald, Thirsby, and Anderson  found that requiring  authors to submit their programs
and data with manuscripts  significantly reduced the frequency and magnitude of errors by
revealing ambiguities, errors, and oversights which otherwise would be undetected (p. 589).
The Journal  ofAgricultural and  Resource Economics requires authors to fully document
data, as well as model  specifications  and estimation procedures.  In addition,  authors must
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provide data, at cost, for five years. In some cases, this has presented conflicts because data
are considered confidential. Copyrighted data or expensive  scanner data are examples that
raise difficult questions about confidentiality versus disclosure.  Such issues lend additional
support for specific guidelines.
Another action that focuses on the reporting of econometric  results has been proposed
by Cooley and Leroy. Because economic theory generates incompletely specified statistical
tests, they, too, argue that selective reporting and advocacy of certain values are common.
They  offer  in  place  of the  accepted  reporting  style  an alternative  format  developed  by
Chamberlain and Leamer which clearly identifies explanatory variables  in a regression as
"focus variables"  and "doubtful variables."  Extreme values of the focus variables would be
reported  over  a  defined  region  of the  parameter  space,  which  includes  coefficients  of
doubtful and focus variables. A more rigorously specified reporting procedure (such as that
proposed by Chamberlain and Leamer) would limit opportunities for selective reporting and
perhaps more clearly identify research advocacy.
Creation of outlets for research aimed at confirming (or disconfirming) results of previous
studies, formation of a program and data bank, and modifications in reporting styles involve
major revisions in the reporting system. The social sciences must place greater emphasis on
this reporting system as an  institutionalized form of checks and balances.  With improve-
ments in reporting requirements,  much of the needed information could be made available
to other researchers who wish to attempt to reproduce the findings of a study. The ability of
a discipline to weed out questionable research  is aided by rigorous reporting requirements.
Editors of agricultural economics journals need to be keenly aware of the problems that
arise when cliques of authors, reviewers, and editorial boards favor rules that are consistent
with the underlying philosophic orientations of members of the clique. Research that could
be important to te  progress of the discipline may apply different rules and standards. This
research might be reviewed unfavorably by members of the group, since it does not conform
to the group's "rules." As a result, important results may never be published.
While  improvements  in the  institutions  that police the social  science disciplines  are a
necessary step, they are not sufficient to completely prevent abuses by some. Opportunities
exist for violations that might only be detected by the individual  conducting the research.
Great care in conducting studies is required to ensure that results presented to the profession
represent good science in that quantitative methods were appropriately  applied and results
were  accurately  reported  and  carefully  interpreted.  The  relationships  between  research
methodology and contemporary quantitative methods should be a formal component of study
within the social  science  disciplines.  As Tomek points  out, "changes  in current research
protocols will not be easy" (p. 6). It is time to recognize that changes are needed and can be
accomplished.
[Received February  1990; Jfinal version received March 1995.]
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